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Regulating Financial Planners: Assessing the
Current System and Some Alternatives1
Jason Bromberg and Alicia P. Cackley
Consumers are increasingly turning to professionals who describe them-
selves as financial planners for assistance with a broad range of services
(Turner and Muir, 2013). Although there is no statutory or unique defin-
ition of financial planning, it can be broadly defined as a systematic process
that individuals use to develop and achieve their financial goals. Financial
planning typically involves a variety of services including preparing finan-
cial plans for clients based on their financial circumstances and objectives,
and making recommendations for specific actions clients may take. In
many cases, financial planners also help implement these recommenda-
tions by, for example, providing insurance products, securities, or other
investments, selecting the right balance of stocks and bonds for an invest-
ment portfolio, choosing among insurance products, and providing tax
and estate planning. Some financial planning organizations have raised
concerns that no single law governs providers of financial planning ser-
vices, broadly describing this situation as a ‘regulatory gap’ (Financial
Planning Coalition, 2009). There are also concerns that financial planners
may have an inherent conflict of interest in recommending products they
may stand to benefit from selling (GAO, 2010a). In addition, some believe
consumers may be confused by the numerous titles and designations that
financial planners can use (GAO, 2010a).
In this chapter, we first review US federal and state laws and regulations
that apply to financial planners and their activities. Next we assess the
comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the regulatory structure for finan-
cial planners, and we discuss some key consumer protection challenges—
in particular, consumers’ understanding of the applicable standard of
care and the titles and designations that financial planners use. We
conclude with a presentation of some of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of four alternative approaches to the regulation of financial
planners.
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Financial planners are primarily regulated
under investment adviser laws
While there is no specific direct regulation of ‘financial planners’ per se at
the federal or state levels, the activities of financial planners in the United
States are regulated under federal and state laws as well as by regulations
governing investment advisers—that is, individuals or firms that provide
investment advice about securities for compensation. The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) has issued guidance that broadly interprets
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) to apply to most finan-
cial planners, because the advisory services they offer clients typically
include providing advice about securities for compensation. States take a
similar approach on the application of investment adviser laws to financial
planners and, as a result, they usually register and oversee financial plan-
ners as investment advisers.
The SEC and state securities departments share responsibility for the
oversight of investment advisers in accordance with the Advisers Act. The
SEC generally oversees investment advisor firms that manage $100 million
or more in client assets, while the states oversee those that manage less. The
SEC’s supervision of investment adviser firms includes evaluating their
compliance with federal securities laws by conducting examinations of
firms—including reviewing disclosures made to customers—and investi-
gating and imposing sanctions for violations of securities laws. According
to SEC staff, in its examinations the agency takes specific steps to review the
financial planning services of investment advisers (GAO, 2010a). For
example, the SEC may review a sample of financial plans that the firm
prepared for its customers, to check whether the firm’s advice and invest-
ment recommendations are consistent with customers’ goals, the contract
with the firm, and the firm’s disclosures. Yet the frequency with which the
SEC conducts these examinations varies, largely because of resource con-
straints faced by the agency. GAO (2007) has noted that harmful practices
could go undetected because investment adviser firms rated less risky are
unlikely to undergo routine examinations within a reasonable period of
time, if at all. More recently, the SEC stated in a staff report that, as a result
of growth in the investment adviser industry and a reduction in SEC
enforcement staff, the agency ‘likely will not have sufficient capacity in
the near or long term to conduct effective examinations of registered
investment advisers with adequate frequency’ (SEC, 2011a: 3–4).
State oversight of investment adviser firms generally includes activities
similar to those undertaken by the SEC, including specific steps to review
firm financial planning services. States generally register not just invest-
ment adviser firms but also investment adviser representatives—that is,
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individuals who provide investment advice and work for a state- or federally
registered investment adviser firm.
Financial planners can also be subject to broker-dealer
and insurance laws, and to marketing and disclosure
rules
In addition to providing advisory services such as developing a financial
plan, financial planners generally help clients implement their plans by
making specific recommendations, and by selling securities, insurance
products, and other investments. SEC data show that, as of October 2010,
19 percent of investment adviser firms that provided financial planning
services also provided brokerage services, and 27 percent provided insur-
ance (GAO, 2010b).
Broker-dealers
Financial planners that provide brokerage services such as buying or selling
stocks, bonds, or mutual fund shares, are subject to broker-dealer regula-
tion at the federal and state levels. At the federal level, the SEC oversees US
broker-dealers, and the SEC’s oversight is supplemented by self-regulatory
organizations (SROs), including the Financial Industry Regulatory Author-
ity (FINRA). State securities offices work in conjunction with the SEC and
FINRA to regulate securities firms. Salespersons working for broker-dealers
are subject to state registration requirements, including examinations. The
SEC and SROs examined about half of broker-dealers in 2009, the most
recent year for which these data are readily available.
Insurance agents
The states are generally responsible for regulating the business of insur-
ance. Financial planners that sell insurance products, such as life insurance
or annuities, must be licensed by the states to sell these products and are
subject to state insurance regulation. Financial planners that sell variable
insurance products, such as variable life insurance or variable annuities, are
subject to both state insurance regulation and broker-dealer regulation,
because these products are regulated as both securities and insurance
products. Yet the GAO (2009) has reported that the effectiveness of market
conduct regulation, such as examination of the sales practices and behavior
of insurers, may be limited by a lack of reciprocity and uniformity, which
may lead to uneven consumer protection across states. That is, the extent to
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which state regulators accept other states’ regulatory actions may vary, and
not all states have implemented the same, or substantially similar, regula-
tory standards or procedures.
Marketing and disclosures
The SEC and FINRA have regulations on advertising and standards of
communication that apply to the strategies used by investment adviser
firms and broker-dealers to market their financial planning services. In
addition, the SEC and state securities agencies regulate information that
investment advisers are required to disclose to their clients. In the Uniform
Application for Investment Adviser Registration, known as Form ADV,
regulators have typically required investment adviser firms to provide new
and prospective clients with background information, such as the basis of
the advisory fees, types of services provided (such as financial planning
services), and other information.
Existing regulation covers most financial planning
services
Although there is no single stand-alone regulatory body with oversight of
financial planners in the United States, the regulatory structure for finan-
cial planners covers most activities in which they engage. As discussed
above and summarized in Figure 14.1, a financial planner’s primary activ-
ities are subject to regulation at the federal or state level primarily via
regulation pertaining to investment advisers, broker-dealers, and insurance
agents. In interviews with GAO in 2010, staff at the SEC, FINRA, state
securities regulators, financial industry representatives, consumer groups,
and academic and subject matter experts expressed a belief that, in gen-
eral, the regulatory structure for financial planners was comprehensive.
This was largely because, as noted earlier, the activities a financial planner
normally engages in generally include advice related to securities, and such
activities make financial planners subject to regulation under the Advisers
Act. Providing financial planning services would be difficult without
offering investment advice or considering securities, and holding even
broad discussions of securities—for example, what proportion of a port-
folio should be invested in stocks—would require registration as an invest-
ment adviser. In theory, a financial planner might offer only services that
do not fall under existing regulatory regimes (e.g., advice on household
budgeting) but this is likely rare and such a business model may be hard to
sustain. Furthermore, to the extent that financial planners offer services
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that do not fall under such regulation, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau potentially could have jurisdiction over such services.2
Some disagree that regulation of financial planners is as comprehensive
as it should be. The Financial Planning Coalition (2009) contends that a
regulatory gap exists because no single law governs the delivery of the
broad array of financial advice to the public. The group posits that the
provision of integrated financial advice is unregulated, including topics
such as selecting and managing investments, income taxes, saving for
college, home ownership, retirement, insurance, and estate planning.
Instead, it argues that there is patchwork regulation of financial planning
advice, and it sees as problematic having two sets of laws—one regulating
the provision of investment advice, and the other regulating the sale of
products. In addition, certain professionals (including attorneys, certified
public accountants, broker-dealers, and teachers) who provide financial
Figure 14.1 Summary of key statutes and regulations that can apply to financial
planners
Source : GAO (2011).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/9/2013, SPi
Regulating Financial Planners 309
planning advice are exempt from regulation under the Advisers Act, if such
advice is ‘solely incidental’ to their other business activities. According to
an SEC staff interpretation, this exemption would not apply to individuals
who held themselves out to the public as providing financial planning
services, and it would apply only to individuals who provided specific
investment advice in rare, isolated, and non-periodic instances. Banks
and bank employees are also excluded from the Advisers Act and are
subject to separate banking regulation.
While the regulatory structure for financial planners may be deemed
comprehensive by many, enforcement of existing statute and regulation
has been variable. As noted earlier, examination of SEC-supervised invest-
ment advisers is infrequent and market conduct regulation of insurers is
inconsistent. Some industry representatives have argued that a better alter-
native to additional regulation of financial planners would be increased
enforcement of existing law and regulation, particularly related to fraud
and unfair trade practices (GAO, 2010a).
Consumers may not understand that financial
planners have potential conflicts of interest
when selling products
As illustrated in Figure 14.2, financial planners are subject to different
standards of care in their capacities as investment advisers, broker-dealers,
and insurance agents. We describe these in turn.
Fiduciary standard of care
Investment advisers are subject to a fiduciary standard of care: that is, they
must act in their client’s best interests, ensure that recommended invest-
ments are suitable for the client, and disclose to the client any material
conflicts of interest. This fiduciary standard applies even when investment
advisers provide advice or recommendations about products other than
securities, such as insurance, in conjunction with advice about securities.
Suitability standard of care when recommending
security products
FINRA regulation requires broker-dealers to adhere to a suitability stand-
ard when rendering investment recommendations. Hence, they must rec-
ommend only those securities that they reasonably believe are suitable for
the customer. Unlike the fiduciary standard, suitability rules do not
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necessarily require that the client’s best interest be served. Up-front gen-
eral disclosure of a broker-dealer’s business activities and relationships that
may cause conflicts of interest is not required, though broker-dealers are
subject to many FINRA rules that require disclosure of conflicts in certain
situations, even when those rules may not cover every possible conflict of
interest, and disclosure may occur after conflicted advice has already been
given.
Suitability standard of care when recommending
insurance products
Standards of care for the recommendation and sale of insurance products
vary by product and by state. For example, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners’ model regulations on the suitability standard
for annuity transactions (NAIC, 2010), adopted by some states but not
Figure 14.2 Differences in the standards of care required of financial planners
Source : GAO (2011).
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others, require consideration of the insurance needs and financial object-
ives of the customer. Its model regulation for life insurance (NAIC, 2005)
does not include a suitability requirement per se.
Conflicts of interest can exist when, for example, a financial services
professional earns a commission on a product sold to a client. Under the
fiduciary standard applicable to investment advisers, financial planners
must mitigate potential conflicts of interest and disclose any that remain.
But under a suitability standard applicable to broker-dealers, conflicts of
interest may exist and generally may not need to be disclosed up-front. For
example, financial planners functioning as broker-dealers may recom-
mend a product that provides them with a higher commission than a
similar product with a lower commission, as long as the product is suitable
and the broker-dealer complies with other requirements. Because the same
individual or firm can offer a variety of services to a client—a practice
sometimes referred to as ‘hat switching’—these services could be subject
to different standards of care. This raises concerns that consumers may not
fully understand which standard of care, if any, applies to a financial
professional during a given transaction.
Financial services firms that provide financial planning argue that clients
are sufficiently informed about the differing roles and accompanying
standards of care that a firm representative may have. They note that
when they provide both advisory and transactional services to the same
customer, each service—such as planning, brokerage, or insurance sales—
is accompanied by a separate contract or agreement with the customer.
These agreements disclose that the firm’s representatives have different
obligations to the customer depending on their roles. Once a financial
plan has been provided, some companies have customers sign an add-
itional agreement stating that the financial planning relationship with
the firm has ended. In addition, the SEC and FINRA have certain disclos-
ure requirements designed to inform consumers of firms’ conflicts of
interest, compensation, business activities, and disciplinary information,
all intended to help consumers evaluate investment advisers’ integrity.
Nonetheless, the SEC (2011b) has observed that many investors find the
standards of care confusing and do not appear to understand the differences
between investment advisors and broker-dealers or the standards of care
that apply to them. In the same way, the Financial Planning Association has
noted how difficult it would be for an individual investor to discern when
the adviser was acting in a fiduciary or a non-fiduciary capacity. Others have
similarly found that consumers generally do not understand the distinction
between a suitability and fiduciary standard of care, and when financial
professionals are required or not required to put their client’s interest
ahead of their own (Hung et al., 2008; Infogroup, 2010; Hung and Yoong,
2013). In a staff report, SEC (2011b) has recommended a uniform fiduciary
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standard of care, whereby the standard of care for all brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers, when providing investment advice about securities to
retail customers, would be to act in the best interest of the customer without
regard to their own financial or other interests.
Consumer confusion on standards of care may also be a source of
concern with regard to the sale of some insurance products. A 2010
national survey of investors found that 60 percent mistakenly believed
that insurance agents had a fiduciary duty to their clients (Infogroup,
2010). Some insurance products, such as annuities, are complex and can
be difficult to understand, and annuity sales practices have drawn com-
plaints from consumers and various regulatory actions from state regula-
tors as well as SEC and FINRA for many years (CRS, 2010). Some states have
requirements that insurance salespersons sell annuities only if the product
is suitable for the customer, while others do not. Consumer groups and
others have stated that high sales commissions on certain insurance prod-
ucts including annuities may provide salespersons with a substantial finan-
cial incentive to sell these products, which may or may not be in the
consumer’s best interest.
Consumers may be confused about financial
planners’ titles and designations
Individuals who provide financial planning services use a variety of titles
when presenting themselves to the public, including financial planner,
financial consultant, and financial adviser, among many others. FINRA
has identified more than 100 professional designations, five of which
include the term ‘financial planner,’ and 24 of which contain comparable
terms such as financial consultant or counselor. Given the large number of
designations for financial planners, consumers may have difficulty distin-
guishing among them, and even experienced investors are confused about
the titles used by broker-dealers and investment advisers, including finan-
cial planner and financial adviser (Hung et al., 2008; Hung and Yoong,
2013). In consumer focus groups held by the SEC, participants were
generally unclear about the distinctions among titles, including broker,
investment adviser, and financial planner (Siegel & Gale LLC and Gelb
Consulting Group, 2005). In addition, concerns have long existed that
some financial professionals use titles suggesting that they provide finan-
cial planning services as a marketing tool, when in fact they are only selling
products. The Financial Planning Coalition (2009) has noted that some
individuals may hold themselves out as financial planners without meeting
minimum training or ethical requirements.
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Financial planners’ professional designations are typically conferred by
a professional or trade organization. These designations—such as Certi-
fied Financial Planner®, Chartered Financial Consultant®, or Personal
Financial Specialist—may indicate that a planner has passed an examin-
ation, met certain educational requirements, or had related professional
experience. Some of these designations require extensive classroom
training and examination requirements and include codes of ethics
with the ability to remove the designation in the event of violations
(Turner and Muir, 2013). State securities regulators view certain designa-
tions as meeting or exceeding the registration requirements for invest-
ment adviser representatives and allow these professional designations to
satisfy necessary competency requirements for prospective investment
adviser representatives. Nevertheless, the criteria used by organizations
granting professional designations for financial professionals vary greatly.
Privately conferred designations range from those with rigorous compe-
tency, practice, and ethical standards and enforcement, to those that can
be obtained with minimal effort and no ongoing evaluation. ‘Senior-
specific designations’ that imply expertise or special training in advising
elderly investors have received particular attention from state regulators
of late, as a result of cases in which financial professionals targeted
seniors by using such designations to wrongly imply they had a particular
expertise for older investors (SEC et al., 2007). In response, some states
now limit the use of senior-specific designations.
SEC-registered investment advisers must follow SEC regulations on
advertising and other communications prohibiting false or misleading
advertisements, and these regulations apply to investment advisers’
marketing of financial planning services. FINRA regulations on stand-
ards for communication with the public similarly prohibit false, exag-
gerated, unwarranted, or misleading statements or claims by broker-
dealers, and broker-dealer advertisements are subject to additional
approval, filing, and recordkeeping requirements and review proced-
ures. In addition, most states regulate the use of the title ‘financial
planner,’ and state securities and insurance laws can apply to the
misuse of this title and other titles. In many states, regulators can use
unfair trade practice laws to prohibit insurance agents from holding
themselves out as financial planners, when in fact they are purely
engaged in the sale of life or annuity insurance products. But the
effectiveness of the regulation of insurers’ market conduct varies across
states, and GAO (2010c) has noted inconsistencies in the state regula-
tion of life settlements, a potentially high-risk transaction in which
financial planners may participate.
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Some stakeholders have recommended alternative
approaches to the regulation of financial planners
Over the past few years, a number of stakeholders, including consumer
groups, FINRA, and trade associations representing financial planners,
securities firms, and insurance firms, have proposed different approaches
to the regulation of financial planners. Following are four of the most
prominent approaches, and some of their potential advantages and
disadvantages.
Creation of a board to oversee financial planners
In 2009, the Financial Planning Coalition, comprised of the Certified
Financial Planner Board of Standards, the Financial Planning Association,
and the National Association of Personal Financial Advisors, proposed that
Congress establish a professional standards-setting oversight board for
financial planners (Financial Planning Coalition, 2009). The coalition’s
proposed legislation would establish federal regulation of financial plan-
ners by allowing the SEC to recognize a financial planner oversight board
that would set professional standards for and oversee the activities of
individual financial planners, although not financial planning firms. For
example, such a board would have the authority to establish baseline
competency standards in the areas of education, examination, and con-
tinuing education, and it would be required to establish ethical standards
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices. It
would also have the authority to require registration or licensing of finan-
cial planners and to perform investigative and disciplinary actions. The
Financial Planning Coalition contends that a potential advantage of this
approach is that it would treat financial planning as a distinct profession
and regulate across the full spectrum of activities in which financial plan-
ners may engage, including activities related to investments, taxes, educa-
tion, retirement planning, estate planning, insurance, and household
budgeting. A financial planning oversight board could also help ensure
high standards and consistent regulation for all financial planners by
establishing common standards for competency, professional practices,
and ethics.
Nevertheless, many securities regulators and financial services trade
associations believe that such a board would overlap with and in many
ways duplicate existing state and federal regulations, which already cover
virtually all of the products and services that a financial planner provides
(GAO, 2010a). The board could also entail unnecessary additional finan-
cial costs and administrative burdens for the government and regulated
entities. In addition, some opponents of this approach question whether
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‘financial planning’ should be thought of as a distinct profession requiring
its own regulatory structure, noting that financial planning is not easily
defined and can span multiple professions including accounting, insur-
ance, investment advice, and law.
Augmenting oversight of investment advisers with an SRO
Several proposals over the years have considered having FINRA or a newly
created SRO supplement SEC oversight of investment advisers. These
proposals date back to at least 1963, when the SEC recommended that all
registered investment advisers be required to be members of an SRO. In
1986, the National Association of Securities Dealers, a predecessor to
FINRA, explored the feasibility of examining the investment advisory activ-
ities of members who were also registered as investment advisers. The US
House of Representatives passed a bill in 1993 that would have amended
the Advisers Act to authorize the creation of an ‘inspection only’ SRO for
investment advisers, although the bill did not become law. In 2011, the SEC
(2011b) released a staff study recommending that Congress consider new
approaches to address the SEC’s insufficient resources for examining
investment advisers. Among them were authorizing one or more SROs to
examine all SEC-registered investment advisors, or authorizing FINRA to
examine investment advisers dually registered as broker-dealers for com-
pliance with the Adviser’s Act.
According to FINRA, the primary advantage of augmenting investment
adviser oversight with an SRO is that doing so would allow for more
frequent examinations, given the limited resources of states and the
SEC. The Financial Services Institute, an advocacy organization for inde-
pendent broker-dealers and financial advisers, has stated that an industry-
funded SRO with the resources necessary to appropriately supervise and
examine all investment advisers would close the existing gap between the
regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers (GAO, 2010a). Yet
some state securities regulators oppose adding an SRO component to the
regulatory authority of investment advisers, believing that investment
adviser regulation is a governmental function that should not be out-
sourced to a private, third-party organization lacking the objectivity, inde-
pendence, expertise, and experience of a government regulator.
Furthermore, SROs are less transparent than government regulators inas-
much as they are not subject to open records laws through which the
investing public can obtain information. In addition, funding an SRO
and complying with its rules could impose additional costs on firms.
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Extending coverage of the fiduciary standard
As noted earlier, the SEC (2011b) recommended extending coverage of the
fiduciary standard of care to all brokers, dealers, and investment advisers.
Proponents of extending the fiduciary standard of care, including con-
sumer groups, some financial planning groups, and some state regulators,
generally maintain that consumers should be able to expect that financial
professionals they work with will act in their best interests (GAO, 2010a).
They say that a fiduciary standard is more protective of consumers’ interests
than a suitability standard, which requires only that a product be suitable
for a consumer rather than in the consumer’s best interest. In addition,
extending a fiduciary standard could somewhat reduce consumer confu-
sion about financial planners that are covered by the fiduciary standard in
some capacities (such as providing investment advice) but not in others
(such as selling a product).
Yet some participants in the insurance and broker-dealer industries still
argue that the fiduciary standard of care is vague and undefined (GAO,
2010a). They say that replacing a suitability standard with a fiduciary
standard could actually weaken consumer protections because the suitabil-
ity of a product is easier to define and enforce. Opponents also have argued
that complying with a fiduciary standard would increase compliance costs
that in turn would be passed along to consumers or otherwise lead to fewer
consumer choices (GAO, 2010a).
Clarifying financial planners’ credentials and standards
The American College, a non-profit educational institution that confers
several financial designations, has proposed clarifying the credentials and
standards of financial professionals, including financial planners (GAO,
2010a). In particular, it has suggested creating a working group of existing
academic and practice experts to establish voluntary credentialing stand-
ards for financial professionals. Clarifying the credentials and standards of
financial professionals could conceivably take the form of prohibiting the
use of certain designations or establishing minimum education, testing, or
work experience requirements needed to obtain a designation. The Ameri-
can College suggests that greater oversight of such credentials and stand-
ards could provide a ‘seal of approval’ that would generally raise the quality
and competence of financial professionals, including financial planners,
help consumers distinguish among the various credentials, and screen out
less-qualified or reputable players.
Yet the ultimate effectiveness of such an approach is not clear, because
the extent to which consumers take designations into account when
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selecting or working with financial planners is unknown, as is the extent of
the harm caused by misleading designations. In addition, implementation
and ongoing monitoring of financial planners’ credentials and standards
could be challenging. Moreover, the issue of unclear designations has
already been addressed to some extent—for example, as noted earlier,
some states regulate the use of certain senior-specific designations and
allow certain professional designations to satisfy necessary competency
requirements for prospective investment adviser representatives. State
securities regulators also have the authority to pursue the misleading use
of credentials through their existing antifraud authority.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that existing statutes and regulations appear to
cover most, if not all, financial planning services in the United States, and
individual financial planners nearly always fall under one or more regula-
tory regimes, depending on their activities. While no single law governs the
broad array of activities in which financial planners may engage, an add-
itional layer of regulation specific to financial planners may not be war-
ranted at this time. At the same time, more robust enforcement of existing
laws would strengthen oversight efforts.
Financial markets function best when consumers understand how finan-
cial providers and products work and know how to choose among them. Yet
consumers may be unclear about standards of care that apply to financial
professionals, particularly when the same individual or firm offers multiple
services that have differing standards of care. As such, consumers may not
always know whether and when a financial planner is required to serve their
best interests. In addition, consumer confusion about standard of care
remains a concern with regard to advice on, and sale of, insurance prod-
ucts, which is largely outside the jurisdiction of the SEC. Finally, we have
seen that financial planners can adopt a variety of titles and designations
that can imply different types of qualifications, yet consumers may not
understand or distinguish among these designations, leaving them unable
to properly assess the qualifications and expertise of financial planners.
The SEC, FINRA, and state regulators have all taken actions in recent years
to address this issue, but how successful they will be remains to be seen.
Endnotes
1. The present chapter draws heavily on the GAO’s study (2011) on the regulation
of financial planners.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/9/2013, SPi
318 The Market for Retirement Financial Advice
2. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, created by the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, regulates the offering and
provision of consumer financial products or services under federal consumer
financial laws. A financial product or service is defined in the act to include
financial advisory services to consumers on individual financial matters, with the
exception of advisory services related to securities regulated by the SEC or state
securities regulators.
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